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Evolution of Agricultural Institutions in China
Sun He 1
John A. Sondey2
1.introduction
Economic reforms in rural development are of special significance to the future of
agriculture in China and hence the Chinese economy. This paper follows the trend of
changes in agricultural institutions in China, and explains the reasons why those reforms
should occur and the direction they would give the Chinese economy. Unlike many
articles which have described China's reforms as a process of the government's selfselection, this paper considers the variety of forces pushing Chinese reforms in
agriculture forward; not only government's policies but also farmers' reactions to and
their interactions with farm policy.
Since 1978, many policies directed at the agricultural and rural economy have
been proposed and implemented. Some have promoted formation of market mechanisms
for agricultural products, and some have not. The goals of some policies seem to
sometimes contradict one another. Some policies have been constantly advanced by the
authority, and some were offered only as temporary expedients. For example, the "rice
bag" policy, meant to enhance self-sufficiency in grain production, was proposed only
when grain prices spiraled upward in 1995, as the demand for grain grew faster than
supply. Some newer policies were reminiscent of the old planned economy, but it was
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impossible for them to be carried out as the structure that supported their implementation
had disappeared. For example, the effort to maintain wholesale prices of grain at a higher
level than equilibrium to cover the losses of the state-owned grain procurement firms,
became fruitless during 1996-1999. State firms hoarded too much grain to resell in view
of their higher procurement prices and business costs. Farmers and other firms sold grain
at lower prices, and state firms even competed with one another. This paper regards the
institutional arrangements of the rural land and market of agricultural products as the
leading element in changing the agricultural institutions in China.

2. The institutional arrangements of agricultural production organization
before 1978.
The People's Republic of China was born in 1949. Land formerly owned by
landlords was expropriated by the state and distributed to farmers who had had no or little
land. Under this arrangement, land was still privately owned and only the area of land
owned per family was restricted. This institution of land ownership worked well, and it
(through a tax in-kind) provided the authority with sufficient food to make the social
order more stable.
Primary producers' cooperatives began to be created in 1955. Farmers were
organized to work together, and their land, large animals, and farm machinery were
pooled and factored into shares of cooperatives' assets which, in turn, would pay
dividends to shareholders. In 1956 and 1957, cooperative movements were launched, and
several primary cooperatives were incorporated into a higher producers' cooperative
where farmers relinquished individual ownership of land and other production resources,

which became collective property. This process reached its summit in Great Leap
Forward of 1958. A number of higher producers' cooperatives were pooled to form a
people's commune, which was organized much like an army. The Chinese leader, Mao
Ze Dong, explained the features of people's communes, stating: the first thing (for
people's communes) is large, and the second public. Usually, a commune was populated
by 50,000-200,000 people, and some communes exceeded three hundred thousand. The
commune owned the land and other production resources, except that members of the
commune could privately own some small, simple tools. A branch party secretary, sent
by the party committee at the county level, was in charge of agricultural production,
which followed a central plan, as did education, sanitation, public security, and every
other aspect of social life.
In 1958, serious problems arose in the agricultural component of the Great Leap
Forward. The distribution of food in communal dining halls was based in part on the
needs of individuals and, in part, on work performed. Some dining halls consumed the
food intended for an entire year in several months. Members of communes didn't know
what and how much they would gain from their work-efforts, so it was inevitable that
productivity was low.
Concurrent with the agricultural cooperative movement, the institution of state
purchases and sales of farm commodities was established. Nearly all agricultural products
produced by communes had to be sold to the stipulated state-owned agents at low
regulated prices. In tum, those agents sold them to urban residents at low fixed plan
prices as part of the "iron rice bowl".

The end result of Great Leap Forward was an economic disaster but the lesson
remains valuable today. Grain production fell sharply in 1960- 1962, which was called the
"three-years of difficulties" or "three-year adjustments". The Chinese population was
drastically reduced by more than ten million due to starvation and disease 3 •
To overcome organizational difficulties, the institution of the people's commune
was modified to some extent. The commune's dining halls were abolished. Members of
communes were given a small plot of land to grow their own food, which accounted for
approximately five percent of total land area; while a large percentage of land still
remained in public ownership and usage. One of most important modifications was that
the party secretary of the commune no longer controlled production activities directly,
according to the theory of three-level's ownership for land. This theory stated that the
commune and its subordinated "brigades" and "teams" together own the land. However,
"teams" were designated as the fundamental units of production. The team organized
routine production activities and distributed output among its members, after fulfilling the
quotas at a very low price to the state. Leaders of communes and brigades monitored and
examined the effectiveness of production teams under the guidelines of the central plans.
A commune member worked a day, and received a working score for his labor.
Scores differed among members in a team due to gender and age. There were few
tangible incentives to spur members' efforts because of the many aspects of agricultural
production, such as differing lengths of time to produce diverse agricultural products, the
huge land area, different labor amounts and operations needed in different stages of the
production process. All this made it very difficult to monitor and measure commune
members' working efforts. The share of agricultural output that a member obtained was
3
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proportionately distributed on the basis of his total working scores at the end of a year. If
a commune member contributed a certain effort, the gain from this marginal effort will be
distributed equally among all members. Therefore, commune members had no incentive
to work hard, and the more members to a team, the weaker the incentive to produce.
Moreover, the contribution of individual effort in the total collective output was not
recognized, so members inclined to be free riders. Also, a team had less desire to work
hard since the state took a quota of its output at a low price. This system of management
mitigated starvation, but didn't solve the problem of the inherent inefficiency of
communes.
"Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution" implemented during 1966-1977, made
further changes and modifications in the commune systems. Although the Cultural
Revolution was directed by the radical idealists and drastically reduced industrial
production, the radicals focused their energy in urban areas and had less time for the
communes in rural areas. Thus, the Cultural Revolution had little influence on the rural
economic system.

3. Refonns of agricultural production organizations after 1978.
To spur agricultural production, the government began to raise the prices they
paid by agricultural products after 1970. Meanwhile, China, of necessity, began to import
grains on the world market. China was reluctant to do so because it worshiped self
sufficiency in agriculture. However, the shortage of food had always embarrassed the
Chinese government, and the shortfall had become more and more serious as the
population increased and the industrial sector grew.

Pragmatists took power again in China in 1978. The ideas of Deng Xiao Ping,
"seek truth from facts", prevailed. In Deng's most typical words, that statement can be
illustrated by "whether black cats or white cats, only those catching mice are good cats."
And important reforms occurred. The household responsibility system, launched by a few
brave farmers in secrecy in Xiao Gang village of Fu Yang county, An Hui province, was
officially adopted and extended to the whole rural sector. Under the household
responsibility system, the land of a production team was divided into sub-plots, and then
distributed to each farm family of the team. Each family was responsible for agricultural
production on its plot of land. After the farmer sold a quota of his output to the state at a
low price, his family got the remainder of output, and could sell the surplus on the
unregulated market. Therefore, the problem of the lack of internal incentive under the
team system was solved. Meanwhile, the government continually raised producer prices
from 1978 to 1984. In 1984-85, China, for the first time, produced more grains than it
internally consumed.
The Chinese authority relinquished controlled pnces on most agricultural
products over time. Farmers could sell vegetables, fruits, poultry and eggs, beef, lamb,
pork, and other products on the unregulated market. The only remaining regulated prices
on agricultural products were for grain staples and cotton. Even rice, wheat, com, or
cotton could be sold on unregulated markets so long as farmers gave the government the
quotas imposed on them. The levels of quotas were usually kept constant. Therefore, the
lack of external incentive was also relieved. The roles of communes and production
teams disappeared and only the local government function remained. Hence, the names of
communes and production teams were replaced by towns or villages in 1983.

In 1989-90, the producers of grain received a large price increase again, higher
than the fixed retail prices of state-owned grain outlets. The operations of the state-owned
firms, which purchased grains from producers and sold them to urban residents, survived
only through the support of the government subsidies. But, the cost of subsidies became
too heavy for the government budget to sustain. The government determined to eliminate
the subsidies and permit the state-owned firms to raise and change the retail prices of
grains to the level of the open market prices for grains in 1993. Thus, the united retail
selling and ration system for urban residents was abolished, and the grain retail-market
became nearly completely unregulated.
In many provinces, village collectives frequently redistributed land among
villagers based on changes in population, and, sometimes land was redistributed every
two or three years. Land plots of good quality and larger area often were redistributed to
the relatives and friends of village heads, which made most farmers angry. In a series of
laws passed after 1997, including the land decree of 2000, the central government
enforced the stability of tenancy on land plots to ease farmers' resentment and in return
for farmers' help for implementing the policy of birth control in rural areas. The
"responsibility term"4 of land was defined as a period of thirty years, in which land could
not be redistributed. Desert and mountainous land was auctioned to the highest bidder
and its responsibility term could stretch fifty to seventy years.
In 1993, a new arrangement regarding land was instituted m Pindu County,
Shandong province, which was called as "two parts of a field plot". It divided the plot
that each farmer was responsible for into two parts, one part was left to the family to
4
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-----------------------------------------produce food for the family's need, and the other part was allocated to the collective
which centrally rented the land to a few, productive farmers. It was thought that the new
arrangement could solve the problem of the smaller than efficient operating area scale
which prevailed under household responsibility. The arrangement was extended to
Shandong province and its neighbor provinces. However, most farmers disliked the new
system, and they felt their personal rights were infringed because those designated as
competent farmers tended to be the relatives and friends of village heads. However, their
own land plots were reduced, and they managed to show their discontent in different
ways. The central government recognized this problem and repeatedly requested that
local governments stop their rearrangements and maintain the household responsibility
system as it existed. The central government thought of that any arrangement regarding
land should protect most farmers' benefits and respect farmers' own choices, and the
solution for too small a scale of farming should be resolved by the marketplace instead of
by government fiat.
Of course, the land responsibility system does not imply private-ownership of
land in China. The state and village collective still hold important property rights.
Farmers can only engage in certain, designated agricultural activities. For example, a
farmer has no right to change his crop growing plot into a fishing pond without the
approval of local governments. Another important right the state holds is the ability to
requisition land at a low price from farmers for public use. However, local governments
often abuse their rights to requisition land, and expropriate land from farmers and their
collectives and sell it to commercial organizations. County governments can receive
seventy percent of receipts from selling land, collectives more than twenty percent, and

farmers receive only five or seven percent of receipts. Moreover, the representatives of
collectives sometimes use collective receipts for their personal purposes.
In 1994-95, there was a shortfall in grain supplied by Chinese farmers, frustrated
by the relatively low prices of grains. To counter the shortfall, the government raised its
procurement price sharply. At the some time, it enforced its policy of "grain bag" which
meant each locality and its government was responsible for resolving its own problem of
shortage. The policy implied self-sufficiency of grain production at the local level.
However, the effects of the "grain-bag" policy were insignificant, as it proved impossible
to carry out. The best choice for the Chinese government would be to raise the grain
procurement price to ensure the planted area plan was carried out after the land household
responsibility system had been built up. Farmers and local governments in relatively
developed regions, such as Zhejiang, Jiangshu, Shangdong and Guangdong provinces,
had no incentive to plant wheat, rice, and other

grain

crops because there was no

comparative advantage in doing so. Many farmers preferred bearing the penalty rather
than waste the land for which they were responsible. China enjoyed a large harvest of
grain

in 1996, after

grain

procurement prices had been significantly raised in 1994-1996.

Output of grain remained at high levels in the following years, as the procurement price
was kept high to protect farmers' income. In 1998, new problems arose. Huge quantities
of

grain

began to heap up in simple barns that were temporary in nature, and a large

investment was needed to build modem barns. Complicating the problem, the gram
which the government purchased could not be sold because the state-owned gram
companies had high costs and farmers could sell their surplus at a more competitive price
on the open market. The left-over

grain,

after farmers carried out the procurement

contracts, was stocked in farmer's homes since state-owned companies had insufficient
funds to purchase it. State-owned companies could not repay loans owed to the state
owned Agricultural Development Bank, and left the government bearing a big financial
burden, reaching more than 200 billion RMB yuan in 1999. The govenunent then began
to adjust its policies.

4. Recent policies affecting agriculture and farmers
Today, the "Grain bag" policy has been modified. It is no longer necessary that
local governments are self-sufficient in grain production, and it is acceptable to allow the
market mechanism to maintain stability in grain markets. Thus, the central and local
governments can use grain reserves and international or extra-regional grain markets to
restore equilibrium. Trade can be used to solve the shortage of grains and farmers can
best chose what is to be grown by themselves, grain or otherwise. Governments do not
need to impose a master plan of planting and grain procurement. Zhejiang province has
been doing without government controls for two years, and from April 2002, other
provinces have begun to do so, too. The farmers in Zhejiang would like to plant
vegetables and fruits, which have strong local markets as the province embraces three
metropolises, Shanghai, Hangzhou, and Lingbo. However, the Chinese government is
cautious, and it allows only the regions whose consumption of grains are larger than their
own production to do so, including Peijing, Shanghai, Zhejiang, Guangdong Jiangsu and
Shandong. Those regions whose grain outputs exceed regional consumption are not
allowed this choice in production.

China possesses tillable land of two billion mu; i.e. 0.33 billion acres. But, that
land supports more than 0.8 billion in farm family population, and 0.43 billion farmers.
Each farmer has, on average, less than one acre to plant This plot size is minute, even
when farming is conducted by hand. It is estimated that 0.3 billion in farm labor are
underemployed in agriculture. In 2002, income, per capita, for the Chinese rural residents
is less than one third of the income per capita for urban residents5 . Income, per capita of
household, was 2476 RMB yuen for rural residents, and 7703 RMB yuen for urban
residents. It is said that the real income ratio for farmer residents is only sixth of that for
urban residents when the social welfare urban residents enjoy is considered. Large
differences of income and wealth exist between rural and urban residents, which become
another source of social instability. To improve the welfare of farmers, China initiated the
Decree of Rural Land Contract, beginning on March 1, 20036• The decree officially
admits the legalization of some rights of farmers to dispose of the land plots for which
they are responsible. Farmers can earn income from the plot of land rented by a
collective, put their plots into a firm as capital, own a share of its property, rent the plot to
other persons, exchange their plots with each other, and grant the plot to others. Farmers'
children can inherit the rights to the land plot that the collective rents to their parents.
Most of those rights previously belonged to collectives, at least legally. Because of the
rural-urban income disparity, millions of young farmers migrate to cities to look for
work. When a farmer takes a job in a city he is termed a "farmer worker" in China.
Authorities in cities fear the population influx will cause traffic jams, and increase crime,

5 The data of household incomes per capita of rural and urban areas from the Chinese official website,
www.peopledaily.corn.cn/GB/shizheng/252/l 0307/l 0317/20030307/938723.html.
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prostitution and other social problems. They detain the young migrant farmers and return
them to their hometowns under guard. Meanwhile, due to the new prosperity of village
and town enterprises, firms funded by foreigners, and privately owned companies in the
coastal area of China, many new opportunities for employment have been created. On
January 1, 2003, the Office of State Council issued a notice requiring local authorities to
treat farmer workers more civilly. It is the first document aimed at protecting the rights of
farmer workers.

5. Summary
Reforms in Chinese agriculture, which will make for greater efficiency and
productivity, appear to be on a clear track, though some reversals and setbacks have
occurred. Agricultural institutions in China have gradually evolved from central
command control and are becoming much more market oriented. Today, the primary
agents of economic operations are farmer families rather than communes and production
teams. Supply and demand of agricultural products is decided by the market in most
situations. The government still regulates the procurement of cotton and a few staple
grains. However, farmers can make free choices on a wide scope. Returning to a regime
of central planning means going back to poverty, inefficiency, and greater inequity. Most
of the Chinese people do not want to tum time back. China faces many problems at the
moment, such as unemployment, disparity of income between groups of people or
regions, and corruption. However, most Chinese people believe that these problems can
be resolved only through economic development. Economic reforms are the main force
pushing China's economic development.

The influence of the agricultural reforms in China exceeds the scope of
agriculture, farmers, and rural development. Its effect on the whole economy and
economic development nation-wide is also significant. Farmers released from the
commune's rigorous regime have entered the non-agricultural sector, developing village
and town industry, plus private enterprises. They have formed a new socio-economic
group, "farmer workers". This means former farmers or residents still registered as rural
residents now can take jobs in urban areas or the non-agricultural sector, which was
strictly forbidden before 1980. More than ten million farmer workers have immigrated
from other provinces to the developed Guangdong province. The Agriculture Department
estimated that village and town enterprises today employ one hundred and thirty-three
million farmer workers, larger than total employment in the state-owned sector. The
value-added of the private sector in village and town enterprises accounts for seventy
percent of the total value provided by village and town enterprises7. In Zhejiang province,
the state-owned sector accounted for only seven percentage of the total GDP of 2002.
Those factors, in addition to enormous foreign investment, make up the most active and
positive forces driving the Chinese economy today.
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